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Surabhi Karambelkar

HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA: THE
LEGAL-ECONOMIC DESIGN TO FUEL GROWTH?
ABSTRACT
Economic liberalization beginning in the early 1990s has
represented a paradigm shift in policy discourse in India, from
social welfare to economic growth. With its potential benefits of
generating power for the growing economy and significant
revenue through electricity sales and royalty payments,
hydropower development has received center-stage in the hydrorich but economically weaker Himalayan states of India. Using
an institutional approach to examine the evolution of laws and
policies on electricity, land, environment, and water, this article
seeks to uncover how prevailing legal and economic systems
prioritize hydropower generation over other water uses. It
argues that federal and state governments have brought about
regulatory changes that tip the allocation and distribution of
resources and wealth in the favor of increasingly private sectordominated hydropower development. This resource colonization
favors maximizing returns on investment at the expense of
minimizing environmental and social costs. The case of the
Indian state of Uttarakhand illustrates the structural power of the
state government to frame and enforce laws to protect
hydropower development while forgoing considerations of
environmental flows and the de facto water rights of
communities. Changing this status quo will require fundamental
alterations to the current institutional structures to ensure a
more just and equitable hydropower development regime. These
changes—which give greater consideration to socioenvironmental sustainability and promote integrated water
resources management—should comprise: acknowledging
ecosystem and water rights; creating mechanisms where local
communities can contest unfair resource allocation; delineating
guidelines for states’ role as public trustees of water; promoting
local participation in monitoring related to hydropower projects;
and balancing economic goals with alternative water uses.
 Surabhi Karambelkar is a PhD student at the University of Arizona, School of Geography and
Development. She holds a MSc in Environment and Sustainable Development from University College
London. This article was developed through her experience and work in India, and was greatly
benefitted by discussions with Carl Bauer (PhD advisor) and Christopher A. Scott, and fieldwork
supported by the HI-NEX: Irrigation-Hydropower Nexus Project.
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INTRODUCTION
The growing prominence of climate change concerns, coupled with rising
energy demands, has led to the resurgence of interest in hydropower development
in India. With a concentration of over 80 percent of the country’s hydropower
potential of 150,000 megawatts (MW), the North and North-Eastern Himalayan
states1 are at center stage in hydro-development planning. In India, dam proponents
have framed hydropower in purportedly win-win scenarios: it provides clean
energy for the country’s rapidly growing economy and accelerates development in
the economically weaker North and North-Eastern Himalayan states.2 For these
Himalayan states, hydropower dams have been portrayed as “cash registers,”3
boosting weak economies of the host states through generous royalties from
hydropower sales.4
Through the existing legal-economic structure, the state has promoted
hydropower development and upheld the interests of increasingly private sector
dominated project developers.5 Local communities and the environment are clear
losers in this process, where weak enforcement or the absence of regulatory
measures makes it difficult to contest this allocation of resource. Hydropower
developers, meanwhile, gain from the resulting redistribution of power, income,
and wealth.6
This article adopts an institutional approach7 to law and economics as a
guiding framework. Such an approach fundamentally involves understanding the
institutional structures that define rights and entitlements of individuals. Rights, as
used in this article, refer to property rights. In this sense, property is not
conceptualized as a “thing” but a right in or to things.8 Rights are further
considered as “enforceable claims” of individuals to use or benefit from something,
1. CENT. ELEC. AUTH., HYDRO DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR 12TH FIVE YEAR PLAN (2012–2017),
http://www.indiawaterportal.org/sites/indiawaterportal.org/files/hydro_development_plan_for_12th_five
-year_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH8V-9V8Z].
2. Amelie Huber & Deepa Joshi, Hydropower in Sikkim: Coercion and Emergent Socioenvironmental Justice, in WATER CONFLICTS IN NORTHEAST INDIA: A COMPENDIUM OF CASE STUDIES
102, 102 (PARTHA J. DAS ET AL., 2013).
3. MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 140
(1986).
4. Sanjib Baruah, Whose River Is It Anyway?, 47 ECON. POLIT. WKLY. 41, 42 (2012). It is
interesting to note that for a large number of projects, the Power Purchase Agreements are with richer
states that will receive a major proportion of the power generated. In the case of Teesta V in Sikkim, for
example, the power is expected to be transported all the way to the state of Maharashtra in Central India.
5. NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO
POSTMODERNISM AND BEYOND 226 (2d ed., 2006) (noting that the state has influenced the “sphere of
decision-making that reflects the working of whose interests are to count as rights, and whose values are
to dominate”).
6. Id. at 226.
7. The institutional approach has its intellectual foundations in the work of JOHN COMMONS, THE
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924). This book emphasizes the role of law and the courts in
determining the elements of economic system. Specifically, the book discusses how the economy
influences law by bringing to bear pressures on the political and legal systems and how, in turn, legal
changes facilitate the development of economic activities in particular directions.
8. C.B. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in PROPERTY, MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL
POSITIONS 2, 3 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978).
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where at least one other person has the duty to recognize this claim.9 Entitlements
can emerge from rights, but can also mean non-enforceable privilege, liberty, or
resource use by individuals. Rights and entitlements, therefore dictate who has
power, privilege, immunity, and duties, and who has no rights, and thus no
power.10
In the institutional approach, the structure of rights and entitlements is
considered to be shaped by the “legal-economic nexus,”11 wherein legal and
economic systems are “jointly produced” through interdependencies and a
“feedback effect.”12 The feedback between the two systems can both create and recreate rights and entitlements. It is in this process that political and economic
power gets expressed13 to define working rules for going concerns14 that protect
dominant interests.
Governments play a central role in this legal-economic feedback process.
Governments are the primary entities that safeguard rights and entitlements. The
institutional approach is therefore concerned with whose interests government
gives effect through the legal system.15 Changes in the legal system can result in
redefinition of rights and alter how people use, control, and allocate natural
resources. The change in the degree of enforcement of rights can also protect
dominant interests and harm others.16 The institutional approach is crucial in
unpacking this “struggle over entitlements (or rights),”17 in order to understand
whose interests dominate in the evolving legal and economic systems and,

9. Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, The Meaning of Property Rights: Law vs. Economics?, 78
LAND ECON. 317 (2002).
10. Daniel Bromley, Resources and Economic Development: An Institutionalist Perspective, 19 J.
OF ECON. ISSUES 779, 781 (1985).
11. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 5, at 222 (citing Warren, J. Samuels, Essay, The LegalEconomic Nexus, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1556, 1557 (1989)). Samuels considers the nexus “a
continuing, explorative, and emergent process through which are worked out ongoing solutions to legaleconomic problems.” Institutionalists view the legal-economic system as a system of mutual
interdependence rather than atomistic independence. Id. at 1578.
12. MERCURO & MERCURO, supra note 5, at 218−19 (citing WARREN J. SAMUELS & ALLAN A.
SCHMID, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1981)). Samuels and Schmid argue
that the feedback effect arises as follows: legal rights govern who can access and participate in the
economy and the functioning of the economy, whereas economic performance, on the other hand, can
create pressures for legal change. The case of the electricity sector in the United States is illustrative:
laws giving electric utilities a monopoly over power generation and distribution had to be changed due
to growing concerns these utilities were inadequately considering the public interest. As part of this
legal change, utilities lost their monopoly power over electricity generation.
13. Bromley, supra note 10, at 783.
14. Id. at 782 (citing JOHN R. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1961)). Working rules,
according to Commons, are those rules that define what an individual must and must not do, and thereby
provide guidance and restraint in an individual’s transactions. Going concerns are the issues related to
the actual process of the transaction, i.e., the production or consumption of things, including buying,
selling, borrowing, and lending, etc.
15. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 5, at 225.
16. Id. at 224–25.
17. Bromley, supra note 10, at 782.
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ultimately, who gains and who loses as a function of natural resources use and
policy.18
To achieve a more nuanced understanding of the legal framework of
property right, analysis cannot be limited to the formal law. Beyond this “law on
the books”19 approach, the analysis of this article focuses on how the law works in
practice, i.e., “law in action.”20 The aim of the latter type of analysis is to shed light
on how politics—or economic interests—influence the interpretation,
implementation, or enforcement of the law in practice.
This article begins with a brief history of the political economic as well as
hydraulic reforms in India that comprise the broader context for discussion of the
regulatory structures most relevant to hydropower development. Next, it discusses
the evolution of the four main categories of regulations guiding hydropower
development from an institutional lens. The subsequent section analyzes these
regulatory changes and the enforcement system, specifically in the case of the
Indian state of Uttarakhand. Finally, the article identifies lessons from Uttarakhand
and discusses the broader implications of the current pattern of hydropower
development on water resource management and sustainability.
I. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE SHIFTING HYDRAULIC MISSION
To understand how the Indian government is promoting hydropower
development through the existing legal-economic structures, it is important to take
a step back to understand the changes in the legal-economic structure in the country
in the post-independence period (after 1947). As the legal-economic nexus is
dynamic and evolves over time through feedback, tracing the political economic
changes in India offers a lens to understand the broader drivers of economic and, in
turn, legislative changes at the national level. The political economic history also
offers a roadmap to understand the shifts in the “hydraulic mission”21 in India. This
history contextualizes the resurgence of interest in hydropower, and provides
important background for analysis of the institutional structures that govern, and
arguably prioritize water use for hydropower generation.
Changes in Indian economic policy are marked by distinct transitions in
the periods from 1947–1967, 1967–1984, 1984–1991, and 1991 to present times.
The first three of these periods are characterized by the political power of the ruling

18. See generally Carl J. Bauer, Dams and Markets: Rivers and Electric Power in Chile, 49 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 594 (2009) (the author explores the evolution of water and electricity laws in Chile to
argue that these laws have given preference to hydropower, impacting local communities and the
environment in the process).
19. CARL J. BAUER, SIREN SONG: CHILEAN WATER LAW AS A MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL
REFORM 15–16 (2004).
20. Id.
21. F. MOLLE, P. P. MOLLINGA & P. WESTER, HYDRAULIC BUREAUCRACIES AND THE HYDRAULIC
MISSION: FLOWS OF WATER, FLOWS OF POWER 328, 333 (2009). The authors use the term “hydraulic
mission” to indicate the growing endorsement of large-scale infrastructure—dams—to tame water
resources for the benefit of man. This mission refers to the faith in technology and science, especially
large-dam construction, as a way of controlling water for meeting irrigation and electricity needs. The
hydraulic mission was touted as an essential first step in promoting food security and economic
development of the newly independent countries in the post-colonial period.
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Indian National Congress, with leadership represented by Prime Ministers
Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi, and Rajiv Gandhi, respectively. Coalition
governments came to power after 1991. Each of these periods also indicates a
marked shift in India’s hydraulic mission as discussed below.
A. 1947–1967: The Rise of the Large-Dam Era
The Indian post-independence period was influenced by the political and
economic ideals of Jawaharlal Nehru22 who, based on socialist ideology,
considered facilitating rapid economic and social development as the central role of
the federal government. Nehru set up the Planning Commission in 1950 that
developed the national five-year plan framework.23 The first three of these fiveyear plans (1950–1965) reflected Nehru’s socialist focus. Each plan provided for
significant expenditures in infrastructure development to enhance food production
and to promote growth in strategic transport, as well as in industries that
manufactured iron and steel.24 This government-led infrastructure development
gave rise to the hydraulic mission in India: the government sponsored the
construction of large-scale multi-purpose dam projects.25 This was the large-dam
era, where these projects carried a political aura as the “temples of modern India.”26
These projects served as icons of modernity and development, with structures that
could allow the government to deliver the “fruits of development” to the
constituencies of their newly independent country.27 The purported benefits of
these large dams—providing water for irrigation, industries, and electricity
generation—legitimized the government’s and elites’ exercise of power in building
these projects, as these actors were considered to have both the technical expertise
and financial capabilities to execute the projects.28
B. 1967–1984: From Large Dams to Growth in Groundwater Irrigation
Following Nehru’s demise in 1964 and Lal Bahadur Shastri’s29 untimely
death in 1966, Indira Gandhi rose to power in 1967 in a period marked by an
agrarian crisis, high unemployment, and growing big-business-backed political

22. Jawaharlal Nehru was the first Prime Minister of India. He held office from 1947–1964. He was
also the leader of the prominent and then left-leaning political party, the Indian National Congress.
23. Five-year plans are centralized and integrated national economic programs.
24. See RAJIV LALL & ANUPAM RASTOGI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT IN POST-INDEPENDENCE INDIA 1–28 (2007).
25. See FRANÇOIS MOLLE, PLANNING AND MANAGING WATER RESOURCES AT THE RIVER-BASIN
LEVEL: EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF A CONCEPT 12 (2006) (noting the development logic in this
period was heavily influenced by hydraulic development in the United States, particularly that of the
New Deal period. Several projects such as the Damodar Valley Projects “explicitly” drew inspiration
from the Tennessee Valley Authority).
26. J. Bandyopadhyay et al., Dams and Development: Report on a Policy Dialogue, 37 ECON. &
POL. WKLY. 4108, 4108 (2002) (quoting Jawaharlal Nehru).
27. F. MOLLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 335.
28. Id.at 335; RAJEEV SIBAL, THE UNTOLD STORY OF INDIA’S ECONOMY 19 (2011).
29. Lal Bahadur Shastri served as the Prime Minister of India, after Jawaharlala Nehru, from 1964–
1966.
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opposition.30 To strengthen her political creditability at a time of rising populist
politics,31 Indira Gandhi opposed big business.32 Under this approach, which
emphasized rapid rural and agrarian development, India’s hydraulic mission shifted
in focus from building large-scale, long-gestation multi-purpose irrigation projects
to supporting groundwater irrigation through fiscal subsidies.33
The 1970s was a period of growing political instability. This decade
marked the declaration of a period of emergency between 1975 and 1977, an
interim change in government from the Indian National Congress to the Bharatiya
Janata Party from 1977 to 1979, and Indira Gandhi’s return to power (by a slim
victory) in the early 1980s. Following these political changes, Indira Gandhi’s
policy orientation became more conservative and pro-business. This policy shift
resonated with the economic-growth ideology of agencies such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). 34 Increasing social protests, meanwhile, took place against
large-scale hydropower development such as the Tehri and Silent Valley Dam
Projects; groundwater irrigation remained the country’s hydraulic focus.35
C. 1984–1991: Anti-Dam Protests and Economic Liberalization
Rajiv Gandhi’s succession in 1984, after the end of his mother’s tenure,
strengthened India’s economic liberalization prospects.36 Indira Gandhi’s probusiness policies had brought about a change in textile, automobile, cement, and
petrochemical industries that in the short term had led to rapid growth in these
industries. Bureaucrats with a past experience of working for international agencies
such as the World Bank had a growing prominence in Rajiv Gandhi’s
government.37 The experience of industrial growth, and increased sharing of World
Bank and IMF perspectives towards economic development,38 aided Rajiv
Gandhi’s pro-reform government in making a case for further liberalization.39
While there was some hydropower related dam development during Rajiv Gandhi’s
tenure, it faced stiff opposition from civil society groups and activists.40
The change of government in 1989, caused by Rajiv Gandhi’s
assassination, shifted the focus back to populist measures and increased
30. LALL & RASTOGI, supra note 24, at 6. Indira Gandhi, daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru, assumed
office as Prime Minister of India after the demise of Lal Bahadur Shastri.
31. Stuart Corbridge, The Political Economy of Development in India Since Independence, in
HANDBOOK OF SOUTH ASIAN POLITICS, 305, 310–11 (Paul Brass ed., 2009).
32. LALL & RASTOGI, supra note 24, at 6.
33. Id. at 7.
34. Atul Kohli, Politics of Economic Liberalization in India, 17 WORLD DEV. 305, 308 (1989).
35. Manju Menon & Kanchi Kohli, Environmental Decision-Making in India: A Critique, in
WATER & THE LAWS IN INDIA, 359 (Iyer, R. R. Ed., 2009).
36. Rajiv Gandhi, son of Indira Gandhi, assumed office as Prime Minister after Indira Gandhi.
37. Kohli, supra note 34, at 312; Vanita Shastri, The Politics of Economic Liberalization in India, 6
CONTEMP. SOUTH ASIA 27, 42 (1997).
38. Shastri, supra note 37, at 42.
39. Id.
40. See generally Arun Kumar Nayak, Big Dams and Protests in India: A Study of Hirakud Dam,
45 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 69 (2009). One of the most celebrated and famous social protests during this
period was the one led by Medha Patkar in 1988 against the “megadam” Sardar Sarovar Project, a multipurpose dam project that included a hydropower generation function. See id. at 71.

Summer 2017

HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA

367

international borrowing. By 1991, however, these policies had resulted in fiscal
deficits of around nine percent of gross domestic product (GDP).41 The economic
crisis of 1991, as well as broader international currents for “sensible” macroeconomic management as envisaged by the so-called Washington Consensus,
served as the final push for economic liberalization by Prime Minister Narasimha
Rao.42 In short order, Rao proceeded to pass the “New Industrial Policy” to
encourage entrepreneurship and growth in capital markets.43 This policy opened up
India’s economy to foreign investments in export-oriented production44 and
abolished monopolies of any sector or industrial enterprise in an effort to shore up
competitiveness.45 The policy package also envisaged running the public sector
along “business lines,”46 called for a restructuring of the regulatory system, and
abolished the bureaucratic red tape—euphemized as License Raj—that had
purportedly halted private sector investment in the country prior to 1991.47 These
policy changes, in line with the economic liberalization agenda, indicated the
opening of the economy to private and foreign investment, with a restructured role
of the government.48 With a renewed focus on industrial development, particularly
in the production of export-oriented goods, the government considered the growth
of the power sector vital, a major input for industrial production.49
D. 1991–Present: The Resurgence of Hydropower Development
While coal-fired (thermal) power generation has traditionally dominated
India’s power sector,50 growing energy needs,51 and climate change concerns have
revived interest in hydropower development. Where water resources are relatively
plentiful, governments of economically under-developed states have portrayed the
climate change threat as an opportunity to generate revenues.52 Accordingly,

41. Corbridge, supra note 31, at 14.
42. Id. at 14.
43. See GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF INDUS., STATEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY § 11 (July 24,
1991) (India), http://dipp.nic.in/English/Policies/Industrial_policy_statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NL2
-MZKY].
44. Id. at § 13.
45. Id. at § 14.
46. Id. at § 15.
47. Id. at § 20–23.
48. As the government still maintained some regulatory oversight and control, the economic
liberalization was pro-market but not laissez faire. See id.
49. See PLANNING COMM’N, 8TH FIVE YEAR PLAN (VOL I), § 1.4.26–1.4.30 (1992) (India),
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/index8.html [https://perma.cc/3D3K-3C5C].
50. GOV’T OF INDIA, CENT. ELEC. AUTH., DRAFT NATIONAL ELECTRICITY PLAN (2016) (India),
http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/committee/nep/nep_dec.pdf [https://perma.cc/LSS6-4GY4]. Coal-fired
thermal power plants have traditionally contributed to the highest installed energy generating capacity in
India. In March 2016, for example, Coal-fired thermal power plants constituted 61 percent of India’s
total’s power generating capacity. See id. at 1.4.
51. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, INDIA ENERGY OUTLOOK 11–15 (2015), https://www.iea.org/
publications/freepublications/publication/IndiaEnergyOutlook_WEO2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2R6KXJ3].
52. For example, the 2008 Hydropower Policy for the state of Arunachal Pradesh—a remote state
in the north-eastern part of India—reads as follows:
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institutional and policy changes have been brought about to facilitate investment in,
and growth of, hydropower development.53
The change in the government’s overall stance on social welfare, from
Nehru’s socialist ideology to Rao’s focus on economic growth,54 has been reflected
in the changing value of water. As opposed to the development of multi-purpose
dam projects like under Nehru’s leadership, dams are now planned as singlepurpose projects for hydropower generation.55 The use of water for hydropower
generation is thus portrayed as being lucrative not only as a source of revenue, but
also as a source of inexpensive power input for industrial development, presenting
a purportedly win-win scenario for furthering economic development. International
organizations and multilateral lending organizations have also supported this
renewed focus on hydropower development;56 the World Bank has gone so far as to
characterize the Indian Himalayan states as “the most socially and environmentally
benign [hydropower sites] in the world.”57

[T]he growing concern over global warming due to emission of Green House Gases,
particularly from coal based power plants, necessitates the development of
hydropower potential. . . . [O]nce the hydropower projects are developed, they would
contribute towards conservation of scarce fossils fuels and also in significantly
reducing carbon emission. . . . The energy generated from hydroelectric projects will
not only help in meeting the shortage of power at the national level, but will also help
in creating social and development infrastructures, direct and indirect employment
opportunities which would eventually result in opening up of further avenues for
development in this remote and under developed State.
GOV’T OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH, DEP’T OF HYDRO POWER DEV., HYDRO POWER DEVELOPMENT
POLICY (2008) (India), http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/State%20Mega%20Hydro%20
Electric%20Power%20Policy%202008.pdf [https://perma.cc/P69R-GHFP].
53. See infra Parts II, III.
54. PAYAL BANERJEE & ATUL SOOD, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GREEN GROWTH IN INDIA 5
(2012).
55. Baruah, supra note 4. “Multi-purpose projects” refers to projects that serve such multiple
purposes as flood-control, irrigation, hydropower generation, and/or navigation. Newer projects tend to
focus solely on hydropower generation and any associated flood control benefits arising from the
constriction of numerous projects along the river channel that indirectly regulate the flow of the river.
Reviewing the proposed dam projects in Arunachal Pradesh, Baruah notes that of the 147 planned dam
projects, 146 projects solely focus on hydropower generation. Only one project can be categorized as
multi-purpose due to its flood control function. Id. at 51, n.6.
In the Northwest United States, with rising energy costs, the use of water for hydropower
generation became more lucrative than its use for irrigation, thus causing a shift in water allocation for
power generation. See Philip R. Wandschneider, Neoclassical and Institutionalist Explanations of
Changes in Northwest Water Institutions, 20 J. OF ECON. ISSUES 87, 92 (1986) (suggesting how change
in the marginal value of water can shift allocation of water rights).
56. See, e.g., India Hydropower Development, THE WORLD BANK (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.
worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/03/23/india-hydropower-development [https://perma.cc/53YF-BQ
8M].
57. JOHN BRISCOE & R.P.S. MALIK, THE WORLD BANK, 44376, INDIA’S WATER ECONOMY, 32
fig.2.24 (2006). This World Bank publication uses two measures to calculate how benign hydropower
sites are: persons resettled per MW and area submerged per MW. See id. The Indian Himalayas are
sparsely populated and have steep valleys requiring lesser submergence of land. By the logic of the
metric used, the publication is right in categorizing the Indian Himalayas as the world’s most
environmentally and socially benign site for hydropower development. However, the catch in the logic
of this metric, and associated argument, is this: it fails to take into consideration indigenous populations,
few of which remain in the Indian Himalayas, and the fact that the Indian Himalayas are one of the
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II. EVOLUTION OF LAWS
Proceeding from discussion of macro-level political-economic trends,
associated changes in economic policy, and shifts in India’s hydraulic mission,
attention is now turned to changes in the legal systems that govern hydropower.
Application of the institutional approach to law and economics to the Indian
hydropower context, warrants tracing the evolution of laws that govern
hydropower—both on the books and in practice—to understand precisely how the
government is promoting hydropower development and protecting the interest of
project developers.
Because hydropower is a unique physical manifestation of the waterenergy nexus,58 both electricity and water law will be addressed in the following
discussion. Similarly, land is a fundamental input for the construction of dams and
dams can have environmental impacts, so the discussion in this section will also
focus on land and environmental laws. The evolution of these four sets of laws
parallels closely, if not precisely, the broader political-economic changes in the
country. However, the legal system in India was not created over a clean slate, it
was developed over the colonial laws put in place during the British rule.
Therefore, unlike the pervious section on the political-economic changes, this
section traces the changes in laws from the colonial period to help contextualize the
changes in the legal system.
A. Electricity
The history of electricity regulation in India follows the shift from the
Nehru’s socialist ideology, where the public sector played a dominant role in
electricity provision, to the growth-oriented ideology, which provides for a limited
government in the post-1991 economic liberalization era. In practical terms, this
meant the opening up of the electricity sector to private investment; the weakening
of regulatory role of the government over the sector; the rise of project developers
in decision-making regarding regulation of the sector and approval of power
projects; and the consequent implication for growth in hydropower generation.
After India’s independence in 1947, the government enacted the
Electricity Supply Act, 1948.59 This act created State Electricity Boards (SEBs)60
and empowered them to supply electricity.61 The government then passed the

world’s biodiversity “hotspots.” It also fails to take into account the high seismicity of the Indian
Himalayas, which make these mountains anything but a benign site for hydropower development.
58. This is to say, hydropower uses water as an input for production of electricity and this
electricity in turn is used in the management of water resources, including, for example, water
transportation. See Morgan Bazilian et al., Considering the Energy, Water and Food Nexus: Towards an
Integrated Modelling Approach, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 7896, 7898 (2011).
59. The Electricity (Supply) Act, No. 54 of 1948, INDIA CODE (2016). It is important to note that
the power to govern electricity was split between the central government and state governments by
Schedule 7, List III, entry 38 of the Constitution of India. Thus, both the Central government and State
governments can legislate concerning electricity. See INDIA CONST. art. 246 cl. 2.
60. The Electricity (Supply) Act, No. 54 of 1948, INDIA CODE (2016), § 5.
61. Id. § 19.
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Industrial Policy Resolution, 1956,62 which explicitly recognized the socialist
pattern of society as the national objective and transferred all electricity generation
and distribution functions to the public sector.63
While the SEBs were intended to function as for-profit enterprises, their
financial performance was deplorable, owing to larger expenditure in
infrastructure, transmission losses, poor tariff collection, and subsidized electricity
in the agricultural sector.64 The wave of economic liberalization in 1991 resulted in
the passage of the Electricity Supply (amendment) Act in 199165 to attract private
investment in power generation to rescue the poorly functioning SEBs.66 The
government also enacted a new policy in 1991 that permitted foreign private
investment in the power sector and provided investing entities full ownership of the
projects.67 Four year later, the central government amended the 1991 policy to
allow private participation in renovation and modernization of existing power
stations,68 further incentivizing private investment in this sector.
The next wave of reform in this sector arrived as a function of loan
disbursement conditions by the World Bank.69 The reforms began at the state level
in 1995, starting with the state of Orissa,70 and then expanded to other states. These
reforms included unbundling the SEBs, separating the generation, transmission,
and distribution functions. With this unbundling, the government passed the
Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act of 1998,71 establishing the Central

62. Industrial Policy Resolution, 1956, No. 91, Acts of Parliament, 1956 (India), http://www.pib.nic
.in/archive/docs/DVD_11/ACC%20NO%20219-BR/CAB-1956-04-30_113.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZPG3NSR].
63. Id. § 6.
64. See PLANNING COMM’N, GOV’T OF INDIA, ANNUAL REPORT 2011–2012 ON THE WORKING OF
STATE POWER UTILITIES & ELECTRICITY DEPARTMENTS 9–11 (2011), http://planningcommission.gov.
in/reports/genrep/arep_seb11_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPR3-GE3P]. The subsidy in electricity tariffs
was a direct outcome of popular politics in that era. See id. at 9. With a largely rural voter base,
politicians were compelled to meet demands of this voter group to stay in power. See id. at 10.
65. The Electricity Laws (Amendment) Act, 1991, No. 50, Acts of Parliament, 1991 (India),
http://lawmin.nic.in/legislative/textofcentralacts/1991.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2XB-FCMJ].
66. See generally T.G. Arun & F.I. Nixson, The Reform of the Power Sector in India: 1991–1997,
10 J. INT’L. DEV. 417 (1998) (discussing the reasons for and form of economic reforms in India’s power
sector between 1991 and 1997).
67. Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, 100% Foreign Investment in Privately Owned Power
Sector (Oct. 22, 1991), http://powermin.nic.in/en/content/foreign-equity-investment [https://perma.cc/
R2NH-SXTX] (“full ownership” here refers to 100 percent stake in the projects with no equity provided
to the government).
68. GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF POWER, POLICY FOR RENOVATION AND MODERNISATION OF
EXISTING STATIONS (Oct. 28, 1995), http://powermin.nic.in/en/content/policy-renovation-and-modernis
ation-existing-stations [https://perma.cc/RD8N-SBBZ].
69. Anoop Singh, Power Sector Reform in India: Current Issues and Prospects, 34 ENERGY POL’Y
2480, 2482 (2006); SREEKUMAR NHALUR, WORLD BANK LED REFORMS IN THE INDIAN POWER SECTOR:
A CRITIQUE 3 (2007), http://www.worldbanktribunal.org/docs/electricity.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X92QJCH].
70. See PLANNING COMM’N, supra note 64; see also The Orissa Electricity Reform Act, 1995, No.
456, Acts of Orissa Legislative Assembly, 1996 (India), http://www.orissa.gov.in/law/acts/pdf_files/
1995/OERA_1995.pdf [https://perma.cc/3REA-G4UZ] (also known as the Orissa Act 2 of 1996).
71. The Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, 1998, No. 14, Act of Parliament, 1998 (India),
http://cercind.gov.in/ElectReguCommiAct1998.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GPH-E3ZP]. See also The
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Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC)72 and State Electricity Regulatory
Commissions (SERCs),73 which were responsible for determining tariffs,
encouraging competition in the sector, and promoting environmentally benign
policies. The liberalization agenda was pushed forward by the Electricity Act of
2003 that promoted electricity trading74 and provided open access to distribution
grids.75
In the context of these broader changes in the electricity sector, a
significant push for hydropower development (in particular, private sector-led
efforts) began in 1995 and remains ongoing. It started with the central
government’s Mega Power Policy of 1995, 76 which not only provided 10-year tax
exemptions and import duty exemptions77 but also required the government to
obtain land and requisite environmental clearances—considered major hurdles in
project execution78—to reduce expenses incurred by project developers and
promote investment.79 While this policy only applied to power plants with a
capacity of 1,000 MW or higher; the central government instituted the Hydropower
Policy in 1998 to ensure and encourage private participation in all projects,
regardless of size.80 In 2003, the Prime Minister also launched the 50,000 MW
hydropower initiative to expedite hydropower development;81 this included “fast
track” land acquisition and providing environmental clearances in a specific time
frame to avoid project execution delays and associated cost overruns for the
developers. This support at the central government level was followed by
institutions of a number of state-level policies82 to promote private sector
participation in hydropower development, wherein the State Electricity Boards
retained authority to select developers to execute these projects.
What these trends reflect is that broader regulations in the electricity
sector and specific policies that promote hydropower are geared towards protecting
the interests of hydropower developers, while safeguards for local communities and
the environment remain wanting. Independent studies and media reports have
highlighted that State Electricity Boards and Regulatory Commissions, entrusted
with providing regulation and oversight of the sector, are weak. Powerful economic
Electricity Act, 2003, No. 36, Act of Parliament, 2003 (India), http://www.cercind.gov.in/Act-withamendment.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBJ5-YLNY].
72. Id. § 3.
73. Id. § 17.
74. See The Electricity Act, 2003, No. 36, Act of Parliament, 2003 (India), http://www.cercind.gov.
in/Act-with-amendment.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBJ5-YLNY].
75. Id. § 9(2).
76. GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF POWER, MEGA POWER PROJECTS: REVISED POLICY GUIDELINES
(November, 1995), http://www.ptcindia.com/pdf/megapower.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q74J-9QJW].
77. Id. at Art. 5.
78. See infra Parts II.B, II.C.
79. Id. at § 3, 7.
80. GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF POWER, POLICY ON HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT (1998),
http://powermin.nic.in/en/content/policy-hydro-power-development [https://perma.cc/33W3-L2AX].
81. Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister of India, Address at New Delhi at 50,000 MW
Hydroelectric Initiative, (May 24, 2003), http://archivepmo.nic.in/abv/speech-details.php?nodeid=9222
[https://perma.cc/53EK-ANWE].
82. See GOV’T OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH, supra note 52; infra Part III.
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interests guide decision-making of these Boards and Commissions,83 illustrating
how the legal-economic structure is working in the favor of hydropower
development and developers.
B. Environmental Laws
Dams are not environmentally benign.84 Environmental laws and policies
can help mitigate and minimize the impacts of dams. These laws and policies,
however, add to the costs incurred by project developers—i.e., transaction
costs85—as the developers have to carry out expensive impact assessment studies;
bear any financial costs associated with delays in getting clearances from agencies;
implement impact mitigation plans; and carry out ongoing monitoring of projects.
The evolution of environmental laws in India has supported hydropower
development and the interests of developers precisely by minimizing these costs.
As previously noted, the latter years of the hydraulic mission (from 1967
to 198486) were fraught with major anti-dam protests, such as those against Tehri
Dam, Silent Valley Dam, and Sardar Sarovar Dam.87 It was during this period, in
1978 and 1979, that the government initiated environmental impact assessments of
river-valley projects.88 This period also indicated the first ever serious attempt at
environmental conservation in India with the passage of the Wildlife (Protection)
Act89 and a host of pollution prevention acts.90 River valley projects were the first
83. See Navroz Dubash & Narasimha Rao, Emergent Regulatory Governance in India:
Comparative Case Studies of Electricity Regulation, paper presented at FRONTIERS OF REGULATION:
SCHOLARLY DEBATES AND POLICY CHALLENGES (Univ. of Bath (UK), Sept. 7–9, 2006),
http://regulation.upf.edu/bath-06/10_Dubash_Rao.pdf [https://perma.cc/QRP8-XGE5]. See also Asif
Syed, RS 20,000 Crore Hydropower Scam in Sikkim, CURRENT NEWS, May 21, 2012, http://current
news.in/rs-20000-crore-hydropower-scam-in-sikkim-state-govt-in-cahoots-with-pvt-players/
[https://
perma.cc/M4FU-74W7]; Et Bureau, Hydelgate: How the Allotments for Arunachal’s Hydel Projects
Flow Back to Political Funding, ECONOMIC TIMES, May 6, 2013, http://articles.economictimes.india
times.com/2013-04-30/news/38930146_1_national-hydro-power-corporation-laeta-umbrey-nhpc
[https://perma.cc/Z5S5-FSU2].
84. The environmental impacts of dams have received significant scholarly attention. See, e.g.,
PATRICK MACCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS: THE ECOLOGY AND POLITICS OF LARGE DAMS (1998);
Matthew McCartney, Living with Dams: Managing the Environmental Impacts, 11 WATER POL’Y 121,
121 (2009). With a growing concern on the environmental impacts of dams, a World Commission on
Dams (WCD) was established to identify impacts and suggest guidelines for dam building that would
minimize these impacts. The executive summary of the report by WCD can be found at World Comm’n
on Dams, Executive Summary of Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making, The
Report of the World Commission of Dams, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1435 (2001), http://digitalcommons.
wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1253&context=auilr.
85. See Ning Wang, Measuring Transaction Costs: An Incomplete Survey, 2 CONF. TRANS. COSTS
16 (2003). Based on the work of de Soto, this article uses Wang’s conceptualization of transaction costs
as the resources spent in waiting, getting permits to do business, cutting through red tape, etc.
86. See supra Part I.B; text accompanying note 35.
87. See Nayak, supra note 40.
88. Environmental Impact Assessment, Introduction, GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF ENV’T,
FOREST, AND CLIMATE CHANGE, http://envfor.nic.in/division/introduction-8 [https://perma.cc/6BDAM8G7]. River valley projects include those projects that involve construction of structures in the river
valley, such as dams, hydropower projects, canals, irrigation schemes; they may cause impoundment of
water.
89. Wildlife (Protection) Act, No. 53 of 1972, INDIA CODE (2016).
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projects that required the conduct of an environmental impact study;91 the
guidelines for impact assessment for infrastructure projects were later formalized
under the rules of the Environmental (Protection) Act of 198692 and the
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification of 1994.93 The EIA
notification requirements94 and subsequent amendments95 remain the key piece of
legislation governing environmental clearance for projects.
This period of pro-environmental law reform in the context of hydropower
projects reached a turning point in 2006, when the first cost-minimizing change
was established. The EIA Notification S.O. 1533 of that year did not require river
valley projects with installed capacity under 25 MW to obtain an environmental
clearance.96 As a result, these so-called “small” hydro projects97 were also
exempted from having to conduct an impact assessment,98 despite their significant
environmental impacts.99 The Central government thus diluted regulatory
provisions in an attempt to push power development through private investment.100
90. See, e.g., Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, No. 6 of 1974, INDIA CODE (2016);
Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, No. 14 of 1981, INDIA CODE (2016); INDIA CONST. Part
IVA, art. 51A(g), art. 48A (amending the Constitution to impose a duty on the State and citizens to
“protect and improve” the natural environment).
91. GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF ENV’T, FOREST, AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 88.
92. The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, No. 29. Act of Parliament, 1986 (India).
93. GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF ENV’T & FORESTS, NOTIFICATION ON THE ENVIRONMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT (1994), http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ind4656.pdf [https://perma.cc/GSD3T8FQ].
94. Id. at § 2(Ia), associated schedule I (Point 2). All river valley projects, including hydropower,
irrigation, and flood control projects require an environmental clearance from the Ministry of
Environment and Forest before they could be built and operated.
95. EIA Notification 2006 (Principal Rules), Compendium of Gazette Notifications, OMs Under
EIA Notification 2006, Subsequently Amended Notifications, MINISTRY OF ENV’T, FOREST, & CLIMATE
CHANGE [hereinafter Compendium of Gazette Notifications], http://environmentclearance.nic.in/writer
eaddata/EIA%20Notifications.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E5S-6YNJ].
96. MINISTRY OF ENV’T & FOREST, ENVIRONMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT NOTIFICATION 2006 S.O.
1533 (Sept. 14, 2006), http://envfor.nic.in/legis/eia/so1533.pdf [https://perma.cc/MR4D-KMNZ]. If a
project is not included in Schedule I, it does not require an environmental clearance, and therefore is
exempted from having to conduct an environmental impact assessment.
97. It is, however, important to note that the Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006
S.O. 1533, did not use the term “small hydro,” but subsequent policies and the Ministry of New and
Renewable Energy—the ministry that was placed in charge of hydro projects under 25 MW—explicitly
categorizes projects under 25 MW as small hydro. See, e.g., Small Hydro Power Programme, GOV’T OF
INDIA MINISTRY OF NEW AND RENEWABLE ENERGY http://mnre.gov.in/schemes/grid-connected/smallhydro/ [https://perma.cc/9T4R-HJBN].
98. See MINISTRY OF ENV’T & FOREST, supra note 96 (projects that do not require an
environmental clearance do not require an environmental impact assessment).
99. See generally Sarah Kelly-Richards et al., Governing the Transition to Renewable Energy: A
Review of Impacts and Policy Issues in the Small Hydropower Boom, 101 ENERGY POL’Y 251, 251–64
(2017).
100. The justification often employed for exempting small hydro projects from having to obtain
environmental clearances and conduct impact assessments is that
[s]mall hydel projects normally do not encounter the problems associated with large
hydel projects of deforestation and resettlement. The projects have potential to meet
power requirements of remote and isolated areas. These factors make small hydel as
one of the most attractive renewable source [sic] of grid quality power generation.
Small hydro being mostly run of river types is environmentally friendly as it has zero
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A temporary shift in this pro-business regulatory regime came about with
the appointment of Jairam Ramesh as the Minister of Environment and Forest in
2009. Ramesh lobbied against projects with high socio-environmental costs101 and
pushed for identifying and protecting ecologically sensitive zones.102 These efforts
resulted in clearance delays and the cordoning-off of areas for industrial
activities.103 Ramesh’s views of the environmental cost of unfettered growth made
him widely unpopular among the industrial lobby. In 2011, he was pushed out of
the Ministry of Environment and Forest to head the Ministry of Rural
Development.104
The retreat to the pro-growth agenda in environmental regulations and
implementation came with the appointment of Jayanti Natarajan as Ramesh’s
successor.105 This trajectory has developed further after the election of the Modi
government in 2014. Since then, the Central government has decided to amend four
key pieces of environmental legislation—including the Environment Protection Act
emissions while generating electricity. There is no storage of water and no dam is
constructed in these projects and hence there are no displacements of habitation.
Bhuwanesh Kumar Bhatt, Small Hydro Programme in India, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
HYDROPOWER FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 59, 59 (2015) (note that the two terms hydel and
hydro refer to hydropower and can be used interchangeably). Without the need to obtain these
clearances and the added incentives provided, the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy is aiming to
increase the private sector investment in SHP development. See P. Saxena, Small Hydro Development in
India, 6 AKSHAY URJA 24, 24–27 (2013). The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy explicitly stated
that “[p]rojects [SHPs] are normally economically viable and [the] private sector is showing lot of
interest in investing in SHP projects . . . [and that] [t]he SHP programme is now essentially private
investment driven” on their program page for Small Hydro Power Programme. Small Hydro Power
Programme, supra note 97.
101. JAIRAM RAMESH, GREEN SIGNALS: ECOLOGY, GROWTH, AND DEMOCRACY IN INDIA 414–49
(2015) (Mr. Ramesh presented excerpts of his communications with the Prime Minister, where he
specifically raised socio-environmental concerns associated with energy projects). See also Chandra
Bhushan, Jonas Hamberg & Abhinav Goyal, Green Norms for Green Energy: Small Hydro Power,
CENT. SCI. ENVIRON. (2013), http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/report_small%20
hydropower.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6RJ-9A86].
102. See MINISTRY OF ENV’T & FOREST, GUIDELINES FOR TAKING UP NON-FORESTRY ACTIVITIES
IN WILDLIFE HABITATS 1 (2012).
103. Id. For projects that required an environmental clearance, this guideline mandated all such
project proponents to also obtain recommendations of the National Board of Wildlife if the project was
located within a 10-kilometer radius of the designated protected areas, or an explicit consideration and
approval from the National Board of Wildlife if the projects were located inside the protected areas. Id.
at 4. This effectively restricted the activities that could be carried out in and around protected areas, and
added to the time required to obtain a final environmental clearance, which meant an added financial
burden on the project proponent. For a list of projects requiring environmental clearance see
Compendium of Gazette Notifications, supra note 95, at Schedule I.
104. TV Padma, Jairam Ramesh’s Legacy is an Indian Environment Ministry with an Identity, THE
GUARDIAN (July 13, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2011/jul/13/jairam-rameshindia-environment-ministry [https://perma.cc/MKP9-53AB].
105. An example of the same was the award of an environmental clearance to a 1,750 MW
hydropower project in Arunachal Pradesh by Jayanti Natarajan, an award that was marked by extensive
social protests and criticized by the National Board of Wildlife for its impacts on the grounds of
“potential clean energy of the project vis-à-vis relatively fewer environmental and societal impacts,”
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/power/jayanthi-natarajan-gives-go-ahead-todemwe-lower-hydroelectric-project-in-arunachal-pradesh/articleshow/11920955.cms?intenttarget=no
[https://perma.cc/3GN5-F2RV].
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of 1986, the Water Act of 1974, and the Air Act of 1981—to promote “ease of
business.”106 This proposed streamlining has been portrayed by the government as
an attempt to remove the roadblocks for infrastructure projects—specifically,
impediments to hydropower development—that have been “held up for want of
[environmental] permissions,” as stated by incumbent Finance Minister Arun
Jaitley.107 The government has also taken steps to:






weaken the Environment Ministry’s oversight over the clearance process;
remove the requirement for public consultation on all projects that require
an environmental clearance;108
reduce independent representation of scientists and NGOs on the National
Board of Wildlife;109
curtail the power of the National Green Tribunal (NGT);110 and
revoke licenses of NGOs such as Greenpeace111 that are seen as stalling
project development.

This vector of regulatory change in the environment sphere shows a shift
in the legal dimension of the legal-economic nexus, matching that of “ideological
change” in the Indian political-economic structure which now places a high
emphasis on economic liberalization and growth.112 The focus of these regulatory

106. Akash Vashishtha, A Green PM? How Modi’s Government Changed Environmental Laws to
Improve “Ease of Business, DAILY MAIL (May 10, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/india
news/article-3075916/A-green-PM-Modi-s-government-changed-environmental-laws-improve-easebusiness.html. “Ease of Doing Business” is rhetoric adopted and promoted by Narendra Modi’s
incumbent government that speaks to reforming the economy and regulatory structures to make it easy
for investors to set up businesses in the country. See PRESS TR. OF INDIA, Government Places Highest
Emphasis on Ease of Doing Business: Modi, THE NEW INDIAN EXPRESS (Jan. 10, 2017),
http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2017/jan/10/government-places-highest-emphasis-on-ease-ofdoing-business-modi-1558213.html (showing an example of Modi’s comments).
107. Rohini Mohan, Narendra Modi’s War on the Environment, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Apr. 10,
2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/2015/4/narendra-modis-war-on-the-indian-environment.
html [https://perma.cc/E3T8-QQUG].
108. K. Jayalakshmi, India’s Environment Ministry Sending Confusing Signals as Major Laws Stand
to be Amended, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/indias-environmentministry-sending-confusing-signals-major-laws-stand-be-amended-1467555 [https://perma.cc/YMR59CLM]. “Public consultation” here refers broadly to public information provision as opposed to
gathering feedback. Such a consultation is required to be conducted as part of the mandatory public
hearing process under the EPA 1986 and EIA Notification 2006.
109. See Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 2002, Act No. 16, Act of Parliament, 2003 (India),
http://envfor.nic.in/legis/wildlife/wild_act_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PXJ-JY9Q] (the National Board of
Wildlife provides wildlife clearances for projects that may be located in ecologically sensitive zones,
i.e., those with greater environmental impacts).
110. See Vashishtha, supra note 106. See The National Green Tribunal Act, § 3, 2010, Act No. 19,
Acts of Parliament, 2010 (India) (the National Green Tribunal was established under the National Green
Tribunal Act, 2010 to adjudicate cases related to environmental protection and providing compensation
for damages caused by environmental impacts to affected parties).
111. Mohan, supra note 107.
112. Cf. Wandschneider, supra note 55, at 96 (discussing a legal shift in American jurisprudence to
recognize fishery rights of Native Americans because of an “ideological change” based on justice rather
than economic considerations).
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changes, is to minimize costs for the hydropower developers. In the words of
Additional Secretary of Power of the incumbent government, B. P. Pandey, “[h]ow
do we bring down costs or tariff of hydro projects, can we overcome and remove
some of the long-drawn clearance processes taking into account environmental
safety as well and basin studies . . . to restore the investor confidence[?]”113
Coupled with this change in environmental regulation is the weak
enforcement of existing regulations. Examples of such weakened regulation
include:





ongoing monitoring of less than ten percent of the roughly 10,000 projects
cleared by the ministry;114
splitting hydro-projects above 25 MW to projects under 25 MW on paper
to evade the clearance process;115
providing clearance to hydropower projects with grossly incorrect or
inadequate environment data;116 and
dismissing petitions that concerns over socio-environmental impacts of
strategic projects.117

The weak implementation of regulations favors hydropower developers as
they can outright evade clearance requirements, not comply with clearance
requirements—which can be expensive—as the projects are not monitored by the
government, or not worry about socio-environmental impacts altogether.
The clear losers with the changes in the law-on-the-books and weak
implementation of laws-on-the-ground are the environment and local communities.
Hydropower developers have fewer regulatory constraints to construct projects and
limited incentive to address environmental impacts of their projects.118

113. PRESS TR. OF INDIA, Government Prepares Framework to Boost Hydropower Projects in
Country, THE ECON. TIMES (July 13, 2011), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy
/power/government-prepares-framework-to-boost-hydropower-projects-in-country/articleshow/
52092116.cms [https://perma.cc/PQ32-L2UH].
114. NIRMALYA CHOUDHURY & ARUNABHA GHOSH, RESPONSIBLE HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT IN
INDIA CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE, 7 fig.4, 8 fig.5 (Council on Energy, Env’t & Water, Working
Paper No. 2013/5, 2013), http://ceew.in/pdf/NC-AG-Responsible-Hydropower-Development-in-IndiaChallenges-for-future-06Dec13.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TVF-HELK].
115. CTR. FOR SCI. & ENV’T, GREEN NORMS FOR GREEN ENERGY: SMALL HYDRO POWER 16
(Souparno Banerjee & Sheeba Madan eds., 2013), http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/
report_small%20hydropower.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7E9-RLG2].
116. NEERAJ VAGHOLIKAR & PARTHA DAS, DAMMING NORTHEAST INDIA 5 (Kalpavriksh, Aaranyak
& ActionAid India, 2d prtg. 2010), http://conflicts.indiawaterportal.org/sites/conflicts.indiawater
portal.org/files/Damming%20Northeast%20India,%20Single%20page%20format.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9HRA-LCKU]. The authors provide examples of environmental impact assessment reports, such as that
submitted Siyom where the report lists 5 bird species in an area which has over 300 and one of the five
reported species is non-existent. Id.
117. See Ne. Affected Area Dev. Soc’y v. India, Appeal No. 8 of 2011 (National Green Tribal
Principle Bench Jan. 13, 2015) (India). The appellants argued that the project developers and
government had violated provisions of the Environmental Impact Assessment Notification, 2006 as the
developers had filed incorrect data in the impact assessment report. Id. ¶ 4. Nonetheless, the tribal
dismissed the appeal on grounds that it lacked merit. Id. ¶ 104.
118. See infra Part III (discussing hydropower development in the State of Uttarakhand).
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C. Land Laws
“For over half a century, we’ve believed that Big Dams would
deliver the people of India from hunger and poverty . . . The
opposite has happened.”
—Arundhati Roy119
Arundhati Roy is widely known for her critique against displacement of
communities due to land acquisition for big dams, and not without reason. The
most contested project on the Narmada River, the Sardar Sarovar Project, displaced
350,000 people, leaving them without a home or means of livelihood, and also
destroyed some of India’s most fertile lands, undermining food security.120
Land is indeed an important input for hydropower projects, and often a
contentious one.121 Social impacts associated with hydropower development largely
stem from displacement and resettlement related issues.122 Proceeding, the
trajectory of the development of land laws—those on ownership and land
acquisition—is examined; and it is argued that, in the existing Indian legal system,
rights of the government to take land are more secure than individual land rights.
The result is that local communities can contest, but perhaps not resist, land
acquisition for hydropower projects.
The history of right to land ownership in India started with the recognition
of right to property, 123 as a fundament right of all citizens in India. Article 19 of
the 1950 Constitution of India gave all the citizens the right to acquire, hold, and
dispose of property.124 The Constitution also safeguarded such property against
compulsory acquisition by the government except for a legitimate public purpose,

119. Michael Specter, The Last Drop, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 23, 2006, at 69. Arundhati Roy is the
author of the highly acclaimed novel, The God of Small Things, which won the 1997 Man Booker Prize
for Fiction. More relevant to this article, however, Ms. Roy is also an anti-dam activist, known for her
work against dams (including the Sardar Sarovar Dam) on the Narmada River. In 1999, she published an
inflammatory and highly influential essay, The Greater Common Good, in which she argued that the
most important of the Narmada dams, Sardar Sarovar, had raised doubts about the nature of Indian
democracy. “Big Dams are obsolete,” she wrote. Arundhati Roy, The Greater Common Good, in THE
COST OF LIVING 7, 14 (1999). “They’re a [g]overnment’s way of accumulating authority . . . a brazen
means of taking water, land and irrigation away from the poor and gifting it to the rich.’’ Id.
120. Peter Bosshard, Dammed, Displaced and Forgotten, INT’L RIVERS (Mar. 27, 2015),
https://www.internationalrivers.org/blogs/227/dammed-displaced-and-forgotten [https://perma.cc/FZQ588K7]. It is interesting to note that when World Bank approved the Sardar Sarovar Project, the estimated
number of people that were going to be displaced was just 33,000. Id.
121. Land acquisition, resettlement, and rehabilitation are major factors that can delay large
infrastructure projects in general, and power projects in particular. See ASSOCHAM,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, HYDROPOWER @ CROSSROADS 8, 10 (2016), https://www.pwc.in/assets/
pdfs/publications/2016/hydropower-at-crossroads-pwc-assocham-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G4HGHJ46].
122. See generally MICHAEL M. CERNEA, SOCIAL IMPACTS AND SOCIAL RISKS IN HYDROPOWER
PROGRAMS (Oct. 2004), http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/energy/op/hydro_cernea_social%20
impacts_backgroundpaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXC7-8SHC].
123. “Property” here explicitly refers to land.
124. INDIA CONST. art. 19, cl. 1, subcl. f, repealed by The Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment)
Act, 1978.
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and only when due compensation was paid.125 Determining compensation was (and
arguably still is) tricky; to prevent court cases on the grounds of inadequate
payment of compensation, the Parliament enacted the 25th Amendment to the
Constitution in 1971. This amendment granted state governments authority to fix a
compensation amount for land takings at their discretion, and the adequacy of this
amount could not be challenged in courts.126
Losing the ability to contest the compensation amount for takings
foreshadowed a much more fundamental shift in the Constitution regarding
property ownership. In 1978, the fundamental right to property was repealed by the
44th Amendment of the Constitution of India.127 Article 300A, inserted in a new
chapter to the Constitution on Right to Property providing that: “no person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law.”128 This amendment made
property ownership a legal—as opposed to a constitutional—right. As a result, an
aggrieved party cannot approach the Supreme Court of India regarding a breach of
her legal property right.
These changes had important consequences for land acquisition in India.
Until 2013, land acquisition in India was carried out pursuant to the Land
Acquisition Act of 1894 (LAA 1894).129 LAA 1894 gave the government the
power of eminent domain and allowed the taking of property without the consent of
the owner for public uses.130 The act required the government to pay compensation
determined based on land use and location,131 but this payment did not reflect the
demand-based rise in value. This section on compensation also exempted the State
from providing any financial assistance to oustees for resettlement or for any loss
of profits resulting from takings of productive land.132 With only the landowner
considered as the affected entity, the act failed to consider other affected
individuals such as land tenants or seasonal users133. This exclusion has resulted in
gross underestimation of affected families for purposes of facilitating appropriate
resettlement and compensation.
In addition to lack of compensation for those without a legal title to land,
land acquisition in the post-independence period in India was marred by numerous
other issues. There were reports of taking of property without landowners consent
or without the provision of adequate information on landowners’ rights.134 In cases

125. INDIA CONST. art. 31, repealed by The Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.
126. The Constitution (Twenty-Fifth) Amendment, 1971, art 2. Some scholars contend that this
change was a result of fiscal constraints on the part of the government. See, e.g., M.L. Singhal, Right to
Property and Compensation Under the Indian Constitution, JUD. TRAINING & RES. INST. J., April–June
1995, at 1–3, http://ijtr.nic.in/articles/art41.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3S6-UY6F].
127. The Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, art 2; id. art. 6
128. Id. art. 34.
129. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Act No. 1 of 1894, pt. 1, sec. 1, subsec. 2.
130. Id. §§ 6, 3(f).
131. Id. § 23.
132. Id.
133. It is important to note that communal assets of the community were also not compensated as
part of the law.
134. RAVI HEMADRI, HARSH MANDER & VIJAY NAGARAJ, DAMS, DISPLACEMENT, POLICY AND
LAW IN INDIA, (2000), http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN0
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where the landowner was consulted but refused to provide such consent, brute
force was used by the government to take property.135
These issues, together with the displacement of over 16.4 million people
due to dams in the 50 years following India’s independence, were cause for major
anti-dam protests in the country. 136 To alleviate the social protests around dams,
the central government implemented the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Policy in 2007 and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act in 2013137 (LARR 2013). LARR
2013, which repealed LAA 1984, has been instrumental in requiring projects to:





undertake a Social Impact Assessment (SIA) and a public hearing;138
obtain the consent of landowners before taking their property for the
project;139
safeguard irrigated multi-cropped land from acquisition;140 and
provide compensation and rehabilitation assistance to non-titleholders.141

While passing the LARR 2013 was a progressive move on part of the then
incumbent government, the election of the Modi government in 2014 has resulted
in several attempts to significantly weaken the law. The Modi government
proposed a bill in 2015 that attempted to exempt from those progressive clauses of
LARR 2013142 projects in the following categories: “vital” national security or
defense-related projects; rural infrastructure (including electrification); affordable
housing; industrial corridors; and infrastructure projects including public-private
partnerships (PPP).143 Because hydropower can be categorized as supporting rural
electrification—or be developed as a PPP—this could have had the effect of
waiving the need to comply with the requirements under LARR 2013. While the
bill is still under consideration in the Parliament, its prospective goals are to
promote the incumbent government’s “ease of business” rhetoric.144 As land

21311.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NND-VZBQ]. This was a contributing paper to the World Commission of
Dams on the impacts of land acquisition, displacement, and resettlement for dams in India.
135. Id. Lack of consideration for oustees is exemplified by the following statement made by Morarji
Desai to the Pong Dam (an irrigation and hydroelectric dam) oustees: “We will request you to move
from your houses after the dam comes up. If you move it will be good. Otherwise we shall release the
waters and drown you all” in Roy, supra note 119, at 13.
136. Nalin Singh Negi et al., Development Projects vs. Internally Displaced Populations in India: A
Literature Based Appraisal, in ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND MIGRATION 6 (J. Schade & T.
Faist, 2011). Note that the total number of displaced persons during this 50-year period was estimated at
21.3 million. And over half of this total displaced population was displaced by dams.
137. The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, Act No. 3, Act of Parliament, 2013 (India).
138. Id. at § 4.
139. Id. at § 2(b).
140. Id. at § 10.
141. Id. at §§ 3 (c), 31 (2).
142. I.e., id. at §§ 4, 2b, 10.
143. The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement (Second Amendment) Bill, 2015 (India).
144. See sources cited supra note 106.
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acquisition delays and associated costs are a major challenge identified by power
sector investors in the county,145 the 2015 bill is indicative of the government
giving a priority to the interests of these investors.
In the current legal system then, laws give the state government the power
of eminent domain which have overriding authority over an individual’s de jure146
property rights to land. As land acquisition for hydropower development comprises
a public purpose, in situations where individuals wish to contest the acquisition of
their land acquisition by the government, their rights will not prevail as the state
government has the authority to rightfully take property for such a public purpose.
D. Water
Water fuels hydropower plants. How rights to water are defined can
determine whether this fuel is made available free of charge or comes with a hefty
price tag. The characteristics of water rights also dictate whether local communities
that depend on this water are compensated, or not, for the modified flow regime
resulting from hydropower installations on rivers. Modifying the river flow can
hamper when, how, and even whether local communities can draw water from the
river.
This section explores the evolution of water rights in India from the
recognition of certain types of individual rights, to total control of water by the
state government, as well as the implications of this evolution for hydropower
development and local communities that depend on rivers where the projects are
located.
Early renditions of India’s water law date back to the Indus Valley
Civilization in 2500 BC, with evolution of the codified versions and structures that
can be traced to the changes in dominant thinking of the different Hindu and
Islamic rulers over time.147 During the colonial period, the Northern India Canal
and Drainage Act of 1873 was the key law governing use and access to canals for
large-scale irrigation works. This Act vested power in the government authority to
“use and control for public purposes the water of all rivers and streams flowing in
natural channels, and of all lakes and other natural collections of still water.”148
The power of the government to regulate water was altered through the
Indian Easements Act of 1882, which vested riparian rights in owners. Specifically,
the Easement Act recognized the rights of owners of waterfront property to water
passing by, through, or over his land.149 The Act also recognized customary
145. See ASSOCHAM, supra note 121, at 173.
146. Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A
Conceptual Analysis, 68 LAND ECON. 249, 254 (1992) (noting that de jure rights are given lawful
recognition by formal, legal instrumentalities and enforced by government officials; rights holders who
have de jure rights can presume that if their rights were challenged in an administrative or judicial
setting, the rights would most likely be sustained).
147. See generally Philippe Cullet & Joyeeta Gupta, Evolution of Water Law and Policy, in INDIA,
THE EVOLUTION OF WATER LAW AND POLITICS OF WATER 159 (Joseph Dellapenna & Joyeeta Gupta
eds., 2009).
148. Northern India Canal & Drainage Act, 1873, Act No. 8, Act of Parliament, 1873 (India).
149. Indian Easements Act, 1882, Act No. 5, Act of Parliament, 1882 (India). Specifically, the act
provides:

Summer 2017

HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA

381

easements—rights acquired through local custom, such as the right to use a
communal well—and easements through long-use prescriptions, where an
individual could acquire an easement if he was able to prove the use of water for a
twenty-year period.150 Suits for disturbance of an easement could be filed under this
act,151 granting those with easements the power to contest any impacts on their
rights to access and use water.
But, the nature of individual rights changed after India became
independent. In 1950, Constitution of India split the powers to govern water
between the central government and state governments. State governments had
exclusive power to regulate water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and
levees, water storage, and water-power.152 The central government could only
legislate on matters connected to interstate rivers.153 Subsequently, the state
governments passed regulations that prohibited any private ownership of surface
water by individuals,154 and gave the government the ultimate power and right to
control water resources.155 Individual rights to water were recognized as use
rights156 and any easements held by individuals only gave them the right to use the
water, not own, control, buy, sell, or modify it in any way.
The right of every owner of land that the water of every natural stream which passes
by through or over his land in a defined natural channel shall be allowed by other
persons to flow within such owner’s limits without interruption and without material
attention in quantity, direction, force or temperature; the right of every owner of land
abutting on a natural lake or pond into or out of which a natural stream flows, that the
water of such lake or pond shall be allowed by other persons to remain within such
owner’s limits without material alteration in quantity or temperature[.]
Id. § 7(j). It furthermore provides:
The right of every owner of land abutting on a natural stream, lake or pond to use and
consume its water for drinking, household purpose and watering his cattle and sheep:
and .the right of every such owner to use and consume the water for irrigating such
land, and for the purposes of any manufactory situate thereon, provided that he does
not thereby cause material injury to other like owners.
Id. § 7(h).
150. Id. §§ 15, 18.
151. Id. § 33.
152. INDIA CONST., sched. 7, State List, 1950.
153. INDIA CONST. art. 262, 1950.
154. It must however be noted that India follows common law, and under common law, a landowner
has the de jure right to water available under the land, i.e., groundwater. See generally Tony
Puthucherril, Riparianism in Indian Water Jurisprudence, in WATER AND THE LAWS IN INDIA 97
(Ramaswamy Iyer, 2009).
155. See generally PHILIPPE CULLET, WATER LAW, POVERTY, AND DEVELOPMENT: WATER SECTOR
REFORMS IN INDIA (2009); see also Videh Upadhyay, The Ownership of Water in Indian Laws in
WATER AND THE LAWS IN INDIA, supra note 154, at 134. See also examples such as Madhya Pradesh
Regulation of Waters Act, § 3, 1949, Act No. 37, Acts of Parliament, 1949 (India), or the more recent
Bihar Irrigation Act, § 3(a), 1997.
156. A. Vaidyanathan & Bharat Jairaj, Legal Aspects of Water Resources Management, in WATER
AND THE LAWS IN INDIA, supra note 154, at 3, 10. Use rights, in India are considered as usufruct rights
wherein water use can be to meet basic sustenance needs of individuals. The Indian Constitution does
not recognize a right to water, but the use of water for drinking purposes has been recognized as part of
the “Right to Life” under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950. See generally Videh, Upadhyay,
Water Rights and the ‘New’ Water Laws in India Emerging Issues and Concerns in a Rights Based
Perspective, in INDIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT 56–66, (2011) (highlighting court cases that
established the use of water for drinking as a necessary use for protecting the Right to Life).
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To limit state government abuse of power and authority to control water
resources, in 1997, the Supreme Court established the public trust doctrine in India
by categorizing flowing water as public trust.157 While decision amounted to a
progressive reform, it was an incomplete one as the Supreme Court did not provide
guidance on how to define or protect the public interest. The effect was a reform
without teeth: state governments could continue to define public interest at their
discretion while planning water resource projects. The example of acquiring land
for power projects suggests how the public interest can be so narrowly defined that
the interests of local communities are not considered.158 Merely establishing public
trust doctrine and requiring state governments to act in public interest does not
alleviate social concerns nor does is necessarily protect the interests of the wider
public—a decidedly cautionary lesson.
The change in property regime surrounding water—with individual rights
defined as use rights, and vesting the state government with the right to control
water in the public interest, without adequately defining public interest—has been
described as “legal plunder.”159 Indeed, a state is not required to provide
compensation to individuals in cases where proposed projects limit or impact the
access to, or use of, water. This reframing of rights has the effect of vesting states
with significant decision-making power160 and is notable because water allocation
is generally an asymmetric affair.161 In the case of hydropower development, states
have wielded their authority and control to allow the construction of hydropower
projects despite the fact that they impact the water use of local communities.162 By

157. M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath and Others, (1997) 1 SCC 388 (India). The judgment in this case
adopted the public trust doctrine for the first time in the legal history of India, and required the private
motel owner (represented by Kamal Nath and Others) to pay for the degradation caused by their motel
development on the ecology of River Beas. The judgment cited the case of National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court that propelled restoration of water flows to Mono Lake in California, and 1993 to
support the decision.
158. See Part II.B.
159. M.S. Vani, Community Engagement in Water Governance, in WATER AND THE LAWS IN INDIA,
supra note 154, at 167, 186.
160. BRYAN RANDOLPH BRUNS & RUTH SUSEELA MEINZEN-DICK, NEGOTIATING WATER RIGHTS
(2000).
161. Id. at 32 (noting that negotiations on water allocation generally occur “among parties with very
unequal power”).
162. Hydropower is portrayed as being beneficial in the State’s economic interest and thus public
interest. This argument is visible in policies of the water-rich Himalayan states such as Arunachal
Pradesh. See GOV’T OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH, supra note 52; infra Part III.B; Huber & Joshi, supra
note 2, at 102–03. As a result, in these states, hydropower projects are being awarded to largely private
sector interests or as public-private joint ventures despite the impact of these projects on water uses and
access by local communities. See generally VAGHOLIKAR & DAS, supra note 116 (discussing impacts of
hydropower on local water uses in the north-east); see, e.g., Hydro Power Projects, MINISTRY DEV.
NORTH EAST REGION, http://mdoner.gov.in/node/1307#Apr12 [https://perma.cc/D4KX-PA3Q]
(indicating that 74 out of 86 hydropower schemes in Arunachal Pradesh were being privately
developed). In other cases, such as Himachal Pradesh, the State has attempted to waive the grant of noobjection required by local communities before hydropower projects are built in order to expedite their
development. Ashwani Sharma, Himachal Govt’s [sic] Decision to Waive Mandatory Clearences [sic]
for Hydro-Power Projects Raises Questions, INDIAN EXPRESS (Sept. 20, 2014), http://indianexpress.com
/article/india/india-others/himachal-govts-decision-to-waive-mandatory-clearences-for-hydro-powerprojects-raises-questions/.
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awarding and allowing the construction of hydropower projects, state governments
in India have accordingly chosen to protect the economic interests of the State and
project developers over those of the local water users.
III. UTTARAKHAND
In each of the four key areas of law—electricity, environment, land, and
water—political-economic structural changes at the national level have upheld the
interest of the hydropower sector, to the detriment of the environment and local
communities. To develop a more nuanced understanding of how the law plays out
on the ground, and what the consequences look like for the local communities and
the environment, the case of the hydropower development in Uttarakhand, the state
with 17 percent of India’s hydropower potential is explored.163
Hydropower indeed represents an important source of revenue for
Uttarakhand.164 To understand how Uttarakhand is furthering hydropower
development and protecting the interests of project developers, the changes in
water law in the state that implicitly reflect the prominence of hydropower interest
are addressed. This is followed by a discussion of the State’s hydropower policies,
which explicitly reflects the State’s preference for private-sector led hydropower
development. To illustrate how law works in practice, the State’s environment
enforcement regime is explored. Finally, implications and impacts of the current
structure and implementation of laws are discussed in terms of local communities
and the environment.
A. The Evolution of Water Law in Uttarakhand
The history of water law in Uttarakhand can be traced back to the colonial
period when the state was still a part of the extant Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, in
the northern region bordering Nepal. The Kumaon Water Rules of 1917, the first
dedicated water law in the State, regulated water mills and gave the state
government the right to control water.165 Akin to the easement rights under the
Indian Easements Act, 1882,166 these rules recognized easement rights and
customary rights based on established uses prior to the enactment of the rules.167

163. This figure corresponds to roughly 25,000 MW. See GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF POWER,
HYDRO POWER POLICY 2008, http://www.ielrc.org/content/e0820.pdf[https://perma.cc/ND5Q-K5DK]
(the total hydropower potential in India which is ~150,000 MW); see also GOV’T. OF UTTARAKHAND,
POLICY ON HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT BY PRIVATE SECTOR IN THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND (25
MW to 100 MW), at 2 (2008) (noting Uttarakhand’s potential of 25,000 MW).
164. In the Minutes of the Annual Meeting between the Deputy Chairman of the Planning
Commission and the Chief Minister of Uttarakhand in 2012–13, the Minister stressed the fact that
“power is one of our GDP drivers.” See PLANNING COMM’N, UTTARAKHAND 12TH FIVE YEAR PLAN &
ANNUAL PLAN 2012–13 FINALIZATION MEETING BETWEEN HON’ BLE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, PLANNING
COMMISSION & HON’ BLE CHIEF MINISTER, UTTARAKHAND, http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/
stateplan/Presentations12_13/uttarakhand 2012_13.pdf [https://perma.cc/K779-3NBF].
165. Upadhyay, supra note 156, at 137 (“The beds and water of all rivers and natural streams and all
lakes, natural ponds, and other collection of still water within the hill tracts of the Kumaon division are
the property and subject to the control of the state”) (quoting the Kumaon Water Rules, Rule 1 (1917)).
166. See Indian Easements Act, 1882, Act No. 5, Act of Parliament, 1882 (India).
167. See Vani, supra note 159, at 197.
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The government reaffirmed its authority to control all the surface water in the state
in the Kumaon Water Rules of 1930, which broadened the rules’ purview to
include irrigation;168 these rules remained in force until 1975.169 In the case of
domestic water uses, the Kumaun and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act of 1960 gave landowners ownership of wells (i.e., groundwater) and
ponds that fell on their property.170
The regulatory framework governing water underwent significant (and
drastic) change after the government enacted the Kumaon and Garhwal Water
(Collection Retention and Distribution) Act in 1975.171 This Act empowered the
state government to “regulate and control, by rules under the Act, the collection,
retention and distribution of water and water resources.” It also declared that “all
the existing rights (whether customary or otherwise and whether vested in any
individual or in village communities) of use of water, if any in the areas to which
this Act extends, shall stand abolished.”172 The act’s avowed purpose was to
“regulate and control in the public interest the water resources . . . in order to
ensure a rational distribution of water for the purpose of human and animal
consumption, irrigation and industrial development.”173 Yet rules on how such
rational distribution was to take place—or what even counted as rational
distribution—were never framed under this Act. Without a clear guiding
framework to operationalize the intent of the act, the state government was left with
greater authority and leeway to allocate water.
An attempt was made to reform the water law after Uttarakhand attained
statehood in 2000. But, like the preceding Act of 1975, the new Uttarakhand Water
Management and Regulatory Act of 2013 maintained the State’s power to control
and regulate water.174 The act, however, was more progressive than the 1975 one as
it required the creation of the Uttarakhand Water Management and Regulatory
Authority (Authority).
The Authority was authorized to regulate water use granting
“entitlements” for various categories of water uses, ensuring that the allocation of
water for new water resource projects was “economically, hydro-geologically and
environmentally viable.”175 This act vested power in the Authority to arbitrate in
case of disputes among water users. Despite these positive steps to promote
168. Id.
169. Id. at 198. In 1975, these rules were replaced with the provisions of the Kumaon and Garhwal
Water (Collection, Retention, and Distribution) Act, 1975, Act No. 46, Uttar Pradesh, 1975 (India).
170. Vani, supra note 159, at 197 (discussing the Kumaon and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1960, Act No. 17, Uttar Pradesh, 1960 (India)).
171. Id.; Upadhyay, supra note 156, at 139, 140 (discussing the Kumaon and Garhwal Water
(Collection, Retention, and Distribution) Act, 1975).
172. Upadhyay, supra note 156, at 140 n.16 (citing the Kumaon and Garhwal Water (Collection,
Retention, and Distribution) Act, 1975, § 3).
173. Id. at 141 n.19 (Kumaon and Garhwal Water (Collection, Retention, and Distribution) Act of
1975, pmbl.).
174. Uttarakhand Water Management and Regulatory Act, 2013, Act No. 24, Uttarakhand, 2013
(India),
http://www.uttarakhandirrigation.com/uploads/documents/doc_6125_water_managment_
and_regulatory_act-2013_uttarakhand.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5N3-4P3N].
175. Id. § 2(h), 12(b)–(d) (entitlement is defined as authorization by the Uttarakhand Water
Management and Regulatory Authority to use water for a purpose specified in the act).
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equitable management of water, however, the act has fallen short. Almost four
years since the passage of this act, the Authority has not been created, and so no
rules to implement the law been promulgated. This regulatory inaction has allowed
the ad hoc granting of water use rights to continue where hydropower developers
build projects even in cases where they impact local water uses.176
B. Hydropower Policies in Uttarakhand
State policies on hydropower were first implemented in 2008 to provide
several incentives to independent power producers. Along with providing a single
window clearance system for projects,177 the tripartite policies—one each for
projects with generating capacities under 25 megawatts (MW), 25–100 MW, and
above 100 MW—provide several incentives.178 For example, the policies provide
for:






eight to fifteen-year royalty exemptions;
tax exemptions;
cost sharing for ancillary infrastructure construction;
streamlining the process of obtaining clearances; and
granting developers the right to sell power outside the state specifically in
case of projects above 100 MW.179

176. It is also important to note that no record exists of any of the entitlements granted pursuant to
the act, calling into question the current level of enforcement of this act. During the author’s field visit
to Uttarakhand in May–June 2016, she noted that there was limited awareness among government
agencies on the existing of this act.
177. Project developers are generally required to obtain multiple clearances before they can
construct and operate a project. It requires considerable time to apply for a clearance to each individual
agency, such as Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change. To minimize the bureaucratic
process and the associated time to obtain clearances, a single window clearance is set up wherein a
develop makes a single application which is reviewed by all the pertinent agencies and a clearance is
granted. See, e.g., Memorandum from Gov’t of India, Ministry of Environ. & Forests, on Streamlining
of Process of Environment Clearance (Ec) and Forest Clearance (Fc) Cases by Expert Appraisal
Committee (Eac) & Forest Advisory Committee (Fac) Respectively for Hydropower and River Valley
Projects (Hep & Rvp)-Regarding (May 28, 2013), http://envfor.nic.in/sites/default/files/ia-streamliningorder-181013.pdf [https://perma.cc/C846-VVHQ].
178. See generally GOV. OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF POWER, HYDROPOWER POLICY (2008),
http://www.ielrc.org/content/e0820.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y7B-FZ3N] (unofficial version provided by
Int’l. Env. Law Res. Ctr.); INDIAN INST. OF TECH. ROORKEE, WATER FOR WELFARE SECRETARIAT,
HYDROPOWER POLICIES AND GUIDELINES (2008), http://www.ahec.org.in/links/water4welfare/
HYDRO%20POWER%20POLICIES%20AND%20GUIDELINES.pdf [https://perma.cc/QD8Z-P7D9].
179. GOV’T. OF UTTARAKHAND, POLICY ON HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT BY PRIVATE SECTOR IN
THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND (25 MW TO 100 MW) 5–6 (2008), http://uttarakhandjalvidyut.com/
Policy%20On%20Hydropower%20Development%20by%20Private%20Sector%20in%20the%20State%
20of%20Uttarakhand%20(25%20MW%20to%20100%20MW).pdf
[https://perma.cc/VUD4-HE8L];
GOV’T. OF UTTARAKHAND, POLICY ON PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT IN HYDROPOWER PROJECT
ABOVE 100 MW CAPACITY 3 (2008), http://uttarakhandjalvidyut.com/policy%20on%20hydropower%20
development%20by%20(above%20100%20mw).pdf [https://perma.cc/63V3-UNHM]; GOV’T. OF
UTTARAKHAND, POLICY FOR HARNESSING RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES IN UTTARAKHAND WITH
PRIVATE SECTOR/COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 111, 116 (2008), http://uttarakhandjalvidyut.com/re%20
policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/YNL8-EQ8V].; INDIAN INST. OF TECH. ROORKEE, supra note 178, at 11–
13.
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Along with these incentives for project developers, the policies also explicitly
discuss state-level benefits such as royalty payments or the provision of free power.
What is not specified in these policies is the local benefit-sharing
mechanism. Benefit sharing is a systematic effort by project proponents to benefit
local communities affected by hydropower investments; the benefits can be
monetary and non-monetary.180 This process is important generally, but especially
so in the case of mountainous communities. Project construction and diversion of
water for hydropower generation can impact the limited water sources available to
local communities for basic sustenance and livelihood uses, such as irrigated
agriculture. This mechanism, in turn, is one of the only ways local communities
might directly benefit from the construction of hydropower projects. With a failure
to outline this mechanism, the policies explicitly disregard the interests of local
communities in Uttarakhand.
Even when the policy for under 25 MW projects was revised in January
2015, the sections that were expanded were incentives for private sector
investment.181 For example, Section 9B of the 2–25 MW Hydropower Policy
provides for:






provision of government land for the project at a negligible price;
exemption from permission of the state government to purchase
agricultural land or convert agricultural land;
exemption from payment of water royalty;
irrigation clearance; as well as
clearance from the Fisheries Department.182

Not only does this policy not specify benefit sharing mechanisms, it explicitly
disregards local interests. It waives the need to obtain any kind of permission to
convert agricultural land. Nor does the policy require a clearance from the
irrigation or fisheries departments, perhaps the only two departments that may have
had any say over impacts to local irrigation and fishing. And the clearance
exemptions and exemption from royalty payment serve to minimize project costs.
The details of incentives are as follows:
 For projects under 25 MW-single window clearance (Point 6), no royalty payment for micro and
mini projects and royalty exemption for small projects for first 15 years (Point 9.10);
preference to industrial units for power generation for captive use (Point 9.2).
 For projects between 25–100 MW-sharing of power evacuation and ancillary infrastructure
(such as roads and bridges) costs (Points 8.2 and 8.3), assisting projects in obtaining various
clearances (Point 14 (v)), tax exemption for the first 10 years (Point 10.2), exemption from
royalty payments for the first 8 years (Point 11.2)
 For projects above 100 MW, all the incentives of 25–100 MW projects along with right to sell
power outside the state (Point 6).
180. See generally Chaogang Wang, A Guide for Local Benefit Sharing in Hydropower Projects,
128 SOC. DEV. PAPERS 4 (June 2012).
181. Particularly in the case of projects between 2–25 MW, the policy has an explicit focus on the
“private sector” (Point 2).
182. GOV’T OF UTTARAKHAND, POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL HYDRO POWER PROJECTS
BETWEEN 2–25 MW 11–14 (2015).
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But most significantly, these exemptions also serve to waive the limited means of
protecting local community interests through regulatory oversight.
C. Enforcement of Environmental Laws in the State
In Uttarakhand, the enforcement of environmental laws is weak when it
comes to hydropower projects. In fact, none of the projects that applied for an
environmental clearance between 2006 and 2012 were rejected—even where they
contained inconsistent and unscientific information.183
The State is promoting the development of run-of-river hydropower
schemes which are touted as more benign than traditional dam-based projects.184 In
Uttarakhand, however, these schemes involve building dams and long tunnels in
seismically active zones.185 Undertaking blasting to build tunnels destabilizes the
rock formations. In turn, this increases the risk of landslides in seismically active
zones.186
Such run-of-river projects are developed in cascades. Typically, water is
diverted through the tunnel of, say, project A, and an inlet for project B is situated
immediately downstream of the outlet of the project A tunnel. The result is that the
river effectively flows from one tunnel to the next, flowing in the riverbed for only

183. Himanshu Thakkar, Uttarakhand: Existing, Under Construction and Proposed Hydropower
Projects: How Do They Add to the Disaster Potential in Uttarakhand?, S. ASIA NETWORK DAMS
RIVERS PEOPLE REP. 8–9, 12 (2013). Ideally, a clearance is only granted when all project impacts have
been identified in the impact assessment based on existing available scientific information and when the
impact assessment report contains consistent information as well as mitigation measures to address the
impacts.
184. Run-of-river hydropower schemes, unlike traditional hydropower schemes, do not impound
water behind a dam in a large reservoir. These schemes make use of the natural flow of the running
water by diverting it through tunnels over a certain elevation drop to generate power. The water is then
released into the river channel after power generation. Run-of-river schemes are generally argued as
being more benign than traditional schemes as they do not impound large volumes of water and
purportedly work with the natural flow of the river. Accordingly, these projects do not include
traditional reservoir that would require displacement of local communities or impact the environment.
The use of natural flow, likewise, is considered to have limited impact on the ecology of the river.
185. Dunu Roy, Hydropower in Uttarakhand: Is “Development” the Real Objective?, ECON. & POL.
WKLY. 19–22 (2008). The author‘s analysis of the environmental impact assessment studies of three
run-of-river schemes notes that tunnel length for these projects ranges from 1–8 miles, and all these
tunnels are located in Seismic Zone V, where even hard rocks had developed cracks and fissures. See
Thakkar, supra note 183, at 9 (noting that tunnels for run-of-river schemes can range from 3–18 miles in
length and can be wide enough to fit “three trains side by side”).
186. See GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF ENV’T AND FOREST, ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
DEGRADATION AND IMPACT OF HYDROELECTRIC PROJECTS DURING THE JUNE 2013 DISASTER IN
UTTARAKHAND (2014) (study conducted in the wake of the destruction caused by the June 2013 floods
in the state). Chapter 2 discusses the impact caused by drilling and blasting for constructing tunnels and
notes that “tunneling can trigger landslides or slope failures, damage to existing civil structures and
disturbance of water sources . . . [t]unneling in the young Himalayan ranges is a difficult engineering
exercise. This is particularly the case in the vicinity of regionally extensive faults like the MBF, the
North Almora Thrust, or the MCT. Many major HEPs [hydroelectric power projects] in Uttarakhand are
in the vicinity of the last two.”
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a few stretches. In Uttarakhand, cascade schemes with long tunnels have resulted in
the drying of large portions of the river bed.187
Despite these visible tangible effects of developing multiple projects in a
river channel, one after the other, the cumulative impacts of such development has
only recently started to receive consideration, i.e, since 2012. Even so, government
commissioned studies have been inadequate, both in their analysis and
recommendations.188 For example, the cumulative impact study in Alaknanda and
Bhagirathi Basin proposed environmental flows to address the issue of dry river
beds, but the flow only considered the minimum “depth required for movement of
fish.”189 The recommended environmental flow, however, did not include consider
the water needs of other aquatic species, or the people that depended on the river.
What compounds the environmental issues of cascade hydropower
development is the weak monitoring of ongoing construction and operations in
Uttarakhand. Moreover, hydropower construction requires deforestation, resulting
in river bank destabilization. It also produces large quantities of debris, which, if
improperly disposed, add to the suspended solids in the river. State environmental
agencies must ensure that project developers address these issues as required by
their environmental clearance; developers, however, have not addressed these
issues.
Independent studies190 have reported that private developers have
undertaken capacity additions of 22–329 percent to individual projects without
associated justification through supporting studies.191 In other instances, CAG
reported that developers “pegged [projects] just under the threshold of 25 MW . . .
to avoid enhanced royalty payment.”192 With projects also awarded to developers
with no prior experience in the power sector,193 the CAG report forewarned
disaster.

187. Rakesh Agrawal, Hydropower Projects in Uttarakhand Displacing People and Destroying
Lives, 43 ECON. POLIT. WKLY. 14–16 (2013). In his paper, Agrawal presented a personal observation
from his field visit where he noted that 28-mile river stretch between Maneri to Dharasu has become
parched (p. 15). Likewise, in a response to a Cumulative Impact Study carried out in the in Alaknanda
and Bhagirathi Basins, the 50th Meeting of the Expert Appraisal Committee for River Valley and
Hydroelectric Projects [that is a part of the Ministry of Environment, Forest, and Climate Change] noted
that “there is hardly any free river stretch available between the upper most and lower most projects” in
these basins. See Expert Appraisal Comm., Minutes of the 50th Meeting of Expert Appraisal Committee
for River Valley and Hydro Electric Projects (2011), http://studylib.net/doc/6839927/3-rd-june--2011.
188. See e.g. Expert Appraisal Comm., supra note 187.
189. Id. at 3.
190. See, for example, studies by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India, an authority
established by the Constitution of India, which serves as external auditor of government-owned
corporations or companies where the central government has an equity share of 51 percent or
government subsidiaries. See generally The Comptroller and Auditor-General’s (Duties, Powers, and
Conditions of Service) Act, No. 56 of 1971, INDIA CODE (2016).
191. COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GEN. OF INDIA, PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF HYDROPOWER
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION, VI (2009). Similar observations are made
by Roy, supra note 185, at 19.
192. COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GEN. OF INDIA, PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF HYDROPOWER
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION, VI (2009).
193. Id. at 11.
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Perhaps unsurprising, in June 2013, flash floods that killed more than
5,000 people in Uttarakhand and hydropower projects are reported to have
aggravated the floods’ effects.194 Developers that flouted environmental regulations
had a role to play. Improperly disposed debris by the developers added to the flood
impacts.195 Some reports even suggest that, in an effort to maintain water in storage
to generate electricity, hydropower developers did not open their flood gates on
time, as required by the safety protocol. The reservoirs behind the dams in this case
were filled with boulders, causing the river to carve a new path, exacerbating the
effects of the flash flood downstream of the dam.196
D. Summary
In Uttarakhand, the laws and policies on the books—particularly water
laws and hydropower policies—create ample incentives to promote hydropower
development. Hydropower policies specifically focus on what developers can do to
further their economic interests, but contain limited discussion of the
responsibilities of developers towards local communities.
Likewise, the implementation of environmental laws and regulations,
together with the curbing of regulatory oversight, only minimally constrains how
hydropower developers build and operate projects in Uttarakhand. Limited
government monitoring creates opportunities for hydropower developers to cut
costs associated with meeting environmental regulations. Environmental
regulations are just a bottleneck for the state that aims to maximize its revenues
through construction of hydropower projects.197
Changing the institutional structure or its implementation has
distributional consequences.198 Damming the rivers for hydropower generation not
only takes the water away from local communities but, with no benefit sharing
194. See generally GOV’T OF INDIA, supra note 186; PRESS TR. OF INDIA, Uttarakhand: 5,000
Feared Killed, 19,000 Still Stranded, TIMES OF INDIA (June 23, 2013), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.
com/india/Uttarakhand-5000-feared-killed-19000-still-stranded/articleshow/20731541.cms
[https://perma.cc/SG3Q-CFSD].
195. See GOV’T OF INDIA, supra note 186, at 73 (noting that “[t]he problem of muck has never been
debated so intensely as after the recent flood. One of the reasons is the greater visibility of damage in the
proximity of HEPs. Although there was an increase in sediment mobilization generally during the June
2013 flood, it is also suggested that at a local scale, wherever the HEP muck was kept along the river
banks without proper protection, it was a contributing factor towards aggravating the flood damage.”).
196. Sreelatha Menon, MoEF Urged to Suspend Clearance to 6 Uttarakhand Hydel Projects, BUS.
STANDARD (July 20, 2013), http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/moef-urged-tosuspend-clearance-to-6-uttarakhand-hydel-projects-113072000588_1.html
[https://perma.cc/97WMERUX].
197. PLANNING COMM’N, UTTARAKHAND 12TH FIVE YEAR PLAN & ANNUAL PLAN 2013–14
FINALIZATION MEETING BETWEEN HON’ BLE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, PLANNING COMMISSION & HON’
BLE CHIEF MINISTER, UTTARAKHAND 22 (2014) http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/stateplan/
Presentations13_14/uttarakhand_2013_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/39DC-EE6R]. When construction of
new hydropower projects was temporarily stalled after the cumulative impact study in the state and the
June 2013 flash floods, the Chief Minister of the State in the 2013–14 annual meeting with the Deputy
Chairman of the Planning Commission, made the following comment, “non realization of Hydro Power
potential due to environmental bottlenecks [is] resulting in loss of precious revenue to the State.” Id. at
22.
198. See Wandschneider, supra note 55; Bromley, supra note 10.
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mechanisms in place, these communities do not receive the economic gains from
establishing these projects.199 (One scholar notes that the mountain districts
consume barely one and a half percent of the power produced in Uttarakhand.200)
Given State’s ultimate power and authority to control water, and its choosing to
allow the construction of hydropower projects, local communities cannot
effectively challenge the diversion of water by hydropower developers—even if the
river goes dry. In this way, local communities and the environment only stand to
lose in the current political-legal-economic decision-making process in
Uttarakhand that serves the interests of hydropower developers.201
IV. ANALYSIS
This article argues that hydropower developers stand to benefit from the
existing legal-economic structures surrounding hydropower in India. Using an
institutional approach, the preceding analysis of the evolution of laws—electricity,
environment, land, and water—and their implementation, demonstrates that
hydropower development enjoys a privileged position in the regulatory system with
economic pre-eminence over other water uses.
In India, energy generation, particularly hydropower generation, has been
a traditional function of national and state-level government agencies. The
trajectory of development of electricity law and hydropower policy, however,
reflects a growing focus on private sector participation in energy generation. Laws
and policies provide incentives for developers to invest in hydropower generation,
but regulatory oversight remains weak, thereby allowing developers to misuse the
system for personal gain. The weak institutional capacity leaves room for collusive
practices in project allocation.202 It also leaves room for developers to flout
regulations—such as royalty payments203—that add to project development costs.
199. Alluding to the case of hydropower development in the Mekong Region, Karen Bakker, The
Politics of Hydropower: Developing the Mekong, 18 POL. GEOGR. 209, 220 (1999) makes a similar
observation, noting that “[R]evenues are literally tapped and diverted away from local communities in
the form of flows of water and energy.”
200. RAVI CHOPRA, OXFAM INDIA, UTTARAKHAND: DEVELOPMENT AND ECOLOGICAL
SUSTAINABILITY 12 (2014).
201. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 5, at 232.
202. Weak institutional capacity has resulted in the awarding of projects to developers with a strong
political clout or limited background in hydropower development. In Sikkim, for example, hydropower
projects were supposed to be awarded to private developers through competitive bidding, but were
instead awarded to developers with close ties to powerful politicians. There were also instances of
projects awarded to companies with no prior experience in constructing infrastructure or power
generation projects, let alone hydropower projects, such as Athena Projects Pvt. Ltd. See Asif Syed, RS
20,000 Crore Hydropower Scam in Sikkim, State Govt in Cahoots with PVT Players, CURRENTNEWS
(May 21, 2012), https://currentnews.in/rs-20000-crore-hydropower-scam-in-sikkim-state-govt-incahoots-with-pvt-players/ [https://perma.cc/8NSB-XPAG]. In Uttarakhand, likewise, the Comptroller
and Auditor General of India reported that projects were awarded to private companies with no prior
experience in hydropower generation. See COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GEN. OF INDIA, PERFORMANCE
AUDIT OF HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT THROUGH PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION 12 (2009).
203. COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GEN. OF INDIA, PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF HYDROPOWER
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION 14–15 (2009). Projects under 25 MW are
exempt from royalty payments. The report cited the example of a private sector developer that
manipulated the process of determining project capacity, to ensure that the capacity was 24.3 MW,
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Hydropower developers likewise benefit from the dilution of
environmental regulations, and their enforcement, that has occurred along with
economic liberalization. The dominance of the pro-growth ideology in India’s
political-economic system since 1991 has minimized transaction costs for
hydropower developers through the legal structures.204 Some scholars argue that
minimizing transaction costs allows the movement of resources to uses with higher
value, which in turn increases net social welfare. The question of who defines value
and cost, however, is important. In India, the government—which largely dictates
costs and defines operative value(s)—places higher value upon diverting water for
hydropower development. The resulting increases in “net social welfare” benefits
the developers and the government. For the local communities and environment, in
contrast, this benefit is basically non-existent.
In case of land law reforms, the proposed 2015 bill to amend the LARR
2013 could create opportunities for hydropower developers to demand exemption
from the conditions of obtaining public consent, and conducting social impact
assessments, prior to developing hydropower projects. As a consequence, States
could use the power of eminent domain to acquire land for hydropower projects
without giving due consideration to social impacts or public agreement. Moreover,
as the use of water for generating power comprises the characteristics of a public
good,205 state governments can use their power—either of eminent domain or as
public trustees—to justify diverting water for hydropower development to promote
public interest.
Mercuro and Medema argue that “power and hence coercion . . . are a
function of rights.”206 As seen in the case of Uttarakhand, by abolishing individual
water rights altogether, the State has re-created its authority to control water at its
own discretion. Indeed in India, the reallocation of rights to control water has given
states “structural power”207 to influence decisions related to resource and wealth
reallocation.

which was under the royalty payment threshold. The audit, however, revealed that per the stated
guidelines on energy efficiency of hydropower plants, the actual capacity of the project was 25.51 MW.
Royalties are normally the only benefits of a project that may accrue to the local communities, if they
trickle down at all. When benefit sharing mechanisms are not specified, the only way local communities
may receive any benefit, is through channeling of development funds from the State that come out of the
royalty payments, or through establishing development programs that are funded by the royalty
payment. See generally IIED, ROUTING REVENUE FROM HYDROPOWER DAMS TO DELIVER LOCAL
DEVELOPMENT, BRIEFING (2015), http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17285IIED.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D76W7UZ].
204. Bakker made a similar observation in case of hydropower development in Mekong, where she
indicated, “minimising costs (environmental and social) . . . maximises the rate of return on investment.”
See Bakker, supra note 199, at 218.
205. Carol Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common Law Water Rights, in
PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 167
(Carol Rose, 1994) (noting that “when water is used for power rather than consumption, it has striking
public-good characteristics.”).
206. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 5, at 224.
207. Aguilera-Klink & Sánchez-García, Federico Aguilera-Klink & Juan Sánchez-García, Water
Markets in Tenerife: the Conflict Between Instrumental and Ceremonial Functions of the Institutions, 3
INT. J. WATER 166, 172 (2005).
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Similar to the case of Chile, the resource allocation in India grants “de
facto property rights to water”208 to hydropower developers. As water is considered
as an input for economic growth in India, granting and securing de facto property
rights to water has the net effect of indirect privatization of water by “enclosing the
commons,”209 for hydropower generation. In this way, existing institutional
structures give effect—through the law210—to the interests of hydropower
developers,211 who can dam, divert, and dry the river for the purpose of power
generation. In contrast, the lack of effective judicial remedy for long-term water
users leave these affected stakeholders vulnerable.
While diversion of water for generation of hydropower is considered
efficient by the government—where efficiency is conceptualized as production of
the “largest possible output of desired items,”212 the broader socio-environmental
consequences are inequitable. The case of Uttarakhand illustrates this dynamic,
where the environment and local communities bear the costs of, but do not receive
the benefits from, diverting water for hydropower development.213 The example of
hydropower development in Uttarakhand represents what Rob Nixon calls the
“resource law of inverse proximity.” According to this rule, water-using entities
(including people and the environment) located closer to the resource are less likely
to benefit from development of the resource.214
The current pattern of single-purpose hydropower development also has
negative consequences for achieving in India integrated water resource
management, a water governance perspective that recognizes the “full range of
social, economic, and ecological uses of water.”215 Unlike hydraulic development
208. Bauer, supra note 18, at 647.
209. David Harvey, The “New” Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession, 40 SOCIALIST REG.
63, 75 (2004). Harvey discusses how the power of the state is used to dispossess access to the hitherto
public assets such as public utilities and universities as part of the new wave of corporatization and
privatization. In this context, enclosing the commons in this article is understood as cordoning off
stretches of the river—which were erstwhile accessed by local communities—for hydropower
generation.
210. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 5, 225.
211. While small-scale hydropower development is largely private-sector driven, large scale
hydropower generation is showing a growing dominance of private developers as well. In the 12th Fiveyear Plan (2012–2017), for example, 39 percent of the planned hydropower projects were to be
developed through the private sector, as opposed to 37 percent and 24 percent by the national-level and
state-level governments, respectively. This indicates a higher than normal rate of private sector
participation. See CENT. ELEC. AUTH., HYDRO DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR 12TH FIVE YEAR PLAN iii
(2012–2017).
212. See Bromley, supra note 10, 785. But see MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 5, at 6, 228
(noting that an institutional perspective recognizes the availability of “multiplicity of efficient
solutions”). In India, of available water uses, hydropower is considered more efficient given the
economic benefits of such a diversion.
213. In addition to the examples already stated in the article, another observation by Bhushan et al.,
supra note 101, at 15, is that villages whose land was acquired for the project did not receive any
electricity from the project, and had electricity for only five or six hours a day.
214. See Baruah, supra note 4, at 49, citing Rob Nixon, Unimagined Communities: Developmental
Refugees, Megadams and Monumental Modernity, 69 NEW FORMATIONS 62–80 (2010).
215. KEN CONCA, GOVERNING WATER: CONTENTIOUS TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS AND GLOBAL
INSTITUTION BUILDING 124 (2006). While undertaking fieldwork in Uttarakhand in the summer of
2016, the author conducted interviews with several communities located near small-scale hydropower
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in the period immediately following independence where dams were built with the
intention of meeting multiple and broadly social uses of water, the current pattern
of development has failed to adequately consider social and ecological water needs.
This current governance regime has detrimental ramifications with respect to
sustainable development. Indeed, while India has a National Water Policy that
provides a (fleeting) mention of integrated water resource management,216 the
fragmented regulatory and institutional system obviates opportunities for serious
efforts to promote integrated water resource planning. As the article has shown,
India focuses on electricity, water, and environment separately in its misguided
approach to governing hydropower development, which presents complex crosscutting issues.
CONCLUSION
Going forward, achieving sound hydropower development that goes
beyond a narrow economic focus will need to account for equity considerations and
resource sustainability. This will require a fundamental shift in institutional
structures that recognize and protect the water needs (and rights) of local
communities and the environment. The Ministry of Power announced in 2016 that
it intends to create a framework for boosting hydropower development in the
country.217 This presents an opportunity, where the framework can incorporate
mechanisms where local communities can voice their grievances or contest unfair
resource reallocation.
In addition, strict guidelines should be established by the courts to give
state governments clear directions on how they ought to carry out their obligations
as public trustees.218 In light of weak enforcement of environmental regulations and
heretofore limited attention paid to the concerns and suggestions of local
communities, formal mechanisms should also be created—such as citizen
monitoring groups that report to the government—that allow and empower local
communities to monitor project development and report malpractices by
developers.

projects. These projects solely divert water for hydropower generation and by and large do not consider
water needs of communities downstream of the dams. As a consequence, irrigation, which in fact was
one of the key beneficiaries in the multi-purpose dam development era, is significantly impacted. This is
due to the fact that the peak season for hydropower generation coincides with the planting seasons,
thereby creating acute water shortages for downstream farmers.
216. GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF WATER RES., NATIONAL WATER POLICY at Point 9.2 (2012),
http://wrmin.nic.in/writereaddata/NationalWaterPolicy/NWP2012Eng6495132651.pdf [https://perma.
cc/PFE2-SMZU].
217. See PRESS TR. OF INDIA, supra note 113.
218. While conducting fieldwork in Uttarakhand in the summer of 2016, the author came across a
few instances where villages near small-scale hydropower projects formed informal agreements with the
power developer to release a certain quantity of water for irrigation during the planting season. (The
local villagers either had a project office where they could meet the developer, or had a representative
that was in touch with the developer.) The presence of these agreements indicates that in cases where
villagers can discuss their water needs with power developers, and where power developers are open to
forging creative solutions for balancing water needs, the trade-offs between water needs for local use
and power development can be minimized without recourse to litigation and formal rulemaking.
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Finally, the government will need to balance economic benefits of
hydropower development with the benefits associated with other existing water
uses, in order to minimize social-environmental impacts of diverting water solely
for hydropower generation. One mechanism to undertake such a balancing act is to
require hydropower developers to obtain consent from government agencies that
oversee water use for irrigation, fisheries, etc., as well as local communities prior to
commencing a hydropower development project.219 Another mechanism is to create
venues where local communities and project developers can meet, as required, to
forge temporary agreements for water-sharing, without recourse to litigation or
formal rulemaking.
Hydropower undoubtedly has the potential to alleviate India’s growing
energy needs and dependence on coal. But to avoid the disastrous consequences
that the current pattern of hydropower development portends, government agencies
must keep broader sustainability considerations in mind.

219. These mechanisms have existed in the past but were later abolished, as they were considered
bureaucratic “red tape.” In the case of small-scale hydropower, for example, developers did need
clearances from the state Irrigation Department.

